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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GOLDEN KEY REALTY, INC. and 
W. PETER BRANDLEY, 
Plaintiff-Respondents, 
vs. 
P. J. MANTAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19083 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the applicability of the require-
ments of the Statute of Frauds to an accord and satisfaction 
and the application of the substantial basis test to evid-
ence on issues taken from a jury. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried in the Third Judicial District of 
Salt Lake County before a jury, the Honorable Scott Daniels 
presiding. The jury returned a verdict based upon special 
interroqatories. Based upon that verdict the court entered 
a judgment against the appellant in the amount of $5,625.00. 
Thereafter, on motion of the respondents, the court amended 
the judgment as against the appellant for the sum of 
1 
$18,000.00. The court also dismissed the first, second and 
third causes of action of the appellant's counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant respectfully requests that the original 
judgment of the trial court, based upon the jury's verdict, 
be reinstated and that the case be remanded for trial on the 
issues set forth in the first, second and third causes of 
action of appellant's counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The parties entered into a written real estate listing 
agreement whereby the respondents agreed to use reasonable 
efforts to sell appellant's property located in Magna, Utah. 
The listing period was for six months beginning March 4, 
1981 and provided that the appellant would pay to the res-
pondents six percent of the sales price if the property was 
sold during the listing period. Several days prior to the 
termination of the listing agreement the appellant, through 
his own efforts, sold the property to a party not a contact 
found through the efforts of the respondents. 
The appellant disputed that the respondents had used 
reasonable efforts to secure a buyer. After the sale the 
parties had discussions concerning the amount of the comm1°-
sion, if any, that the respondents were entitled to. The 
respondents orally agreed to accept $5,000.00 in [ull settle-
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ment of their claim for a commission and the appellant 
orally agreed to pay that amount. The next day the appel-
lant tendered a check to the respondent in the amount of 
$2,500.00. The respondent accepted the check but indicated 
that he would talk to an attorney about it. Thereafter the 
check was returned to the appellant and the respondents in-
itiated legal proceedings in which it was claimed that be-
cause the property sold for $300,000.00 that a commission 
was due them in the sum of $18,000.00. The appellant 
counterclaimed alleging that an accord and satisfaction had 
been effected and, additionally, that the respondent had 
breached his fiduciary duty to the appellant by conspiring 
with a third party to procure the property for himself and 
this third party on terms more favorable to them and dis-
advantageous to the appellant. 
The case was submitted to a jury upon two special in-
terrogatories. These were answered as follows: 
1. Did the parties ever consummate an 
accord and satisfaction or settlement of their 
dispute? 
Answer: Yes. 
2. Did the plaintiff Peter Brandley fail 
to use reasonable efforts to try to procure 
a purchaser for the property? 
Answer: No. 
The issues presented in appellant's counterclaim alleg-
ing fraud, conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty were not 
given to the jury. The court ruled, after the presentation 
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of the evidence that there was insufficient evidence pre-
sented on these issues to allow them to go to the iury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS THAT REQUIRE THAT 
ANY SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT WHICH ALTERS OR AMENDS AN AGREEMENT 
REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS TO BE IN WRITING MUST ALSO 
BE IN WRITING HAS NO APPLICATION TO AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTIC', 
This court defined accord and satisfaction on numerous 
occasions and has held that an accord and satisfaction arises 
where the parties to an agreement resolve that a given per-
formance by one party, offered in substitution of the per-
formance originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation 
created under the original agreement. Sugarhouse Finance Co, 
v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980). The Sugarhouse 
case is in line with previous decisions and the definition 
of accord and satisfaction set forth in the 1977 case of 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1363 
(Utah 1977). The jury in the instant case was instructed by 
the court on accord and satisfaction and returned a verdict 
finding that an accord and satisfaction had been consummated 
by the parties. 
The basis of respondents' motion to al tcr nr .1ri 0 rHi thP 
judgment was that because the listing >l•Jr<'<"ment \·1,is requir••'d 
to be in wri tinq by the Statute Gf Frauds that ""··· "1ter,it 1 '" 
or amendment to that agreement must also be in wr1t1w1. The 
I f' r .1 ·1 • 1 c. , f, 4 G P . \ l 7 1 I case of Strevell-Pate_r_son Co_:_• __ nc. v. 
(l'tah 1982) was relied upon by the respondents as their 
principle authority. However, the doctrine expressed in the 
Strevell-Paterson case does not apply to an accord and sat-
isfaction. 
Strevell-Paterson dealt with an action by a creditor a-
gainst a guarantor of the debt wherein the guarantor claimed 
that an oral agreement of the parties had released him of 
his obligation. This court held that the release or revo-
cation of an agreement to answer for the debt of another 
must also be in writing. The issue of an accord and satis-
faction was not addressed. 
An accord and satisfaction is not an amendment or alter-
ation of a previous agreement. It is a new agreement sub-
stituted for the original. Cannon v. Stevens School of 
Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1363, 1386 (Utah 1977). Generally, 
it is a method of discharging a contract or settling a claim 
arising from a contract by substituting a new and substitute 
contract. Zions First National Bank v. Johnson, 641 P.2d 
158, 160 (Utah 1982). The key words are "new" and "substi-
tute." To substitute means to put into the place of another 
person or thing, or to exchange. Words and Phrases, Vol. 40, 
p. 863 (1964). Because an accord and satisfaction is a new 
1greement that does not alter or amend, but replaces a pre-
v1nus agreement, the Statute of Frauds does not apply. 
several cases have specifically held that an accord and 
satisfaction need not be evidenced by any formal instrument. 
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1 Am Jur 2d 303 (1962). This court in the case of Christensen 
v. Abbott, 595 P.2d 900 (Utah 1979) held that there is no re-
quirement that an accord and satisfaction must be in writing. 
In the Christensen case this court upheld the trial court's 
finding that the parties had settled their dispute on the 
payment of a prommissory note with an accord and satisfaction. 
It was an oral agreement that canceled an $111,000.00 note. 
Id. at 902. 
The ruling in the Christensen case is in conformity with 
the Wyoming case of Gaido v. Tysdal, 235 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1951). 
This case involved the sale of land and the timber thereon. 
The court specifically held that a written contract for the 
sale of land, while still executory, could be rescinded by 
oral agreement. Id. at 746. But in discussing the case 
the court said: 
But the great weight of authority supports 
the rule that the statute of frauds has no appli-
cation where there has been a full and complete 
performance of the contract by one of the con-
tracting parties . 
This is similar to the facts in the instant case where 
it can be said that the respondent had completed his perform-
ance under the listing agreement. The court in Gaido went 
on to state: 
The general rule permitting written 
contracts to be abrogated or rescinded by an 
oral agreement is fully applicable to contracts 
required by the statute of frauds to be in 
writing; and such a contract may be the sub-
ject of an oral accord and sat1sfact1on . 
Id. at 748. 
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The United States Supreme Court has ruled on this issue. 
In the case of Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Met. 486 (Mass. 1842), 
dealing with the question of whether or not a subsequent 
parole ageement for the sale of printing cloth might be given 
into evidence on a written contract the Supreme Court held 
that oral agreements, similar to a plea of accord and satis-
faction, not being with the statute of frauds, should be 
admitted into evidence. Id. at 492, 494. 
Because an accord and satisfaction is a new agreement, 
not a modification of the original, a consideration of the 
defense of the Statute of Frauds to its being effective is 
not necessary. 1 Arn Jur 2d 49 (1962). 
POINT II 
A COURT SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY ISSUES FROM THE JURY UNLESS IT 
IS PLAIN THAT THERE IS REALLY NO CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE 
UPON WHICH REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER. 
In ruling on motions which would take issues of fact a-
way from a jury the trial court must look at the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences that reasonably may be drawn 
therefrom and grant the motion only if there is no substan-
tial basis therein which would support a verdict in favor 
of the party being moved against. Mel Hardman Productions, 
Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979). On appeal 
this court looks at the evidence in the same manner. Id. 
The appellant presented evidence at trial that the res-
pondent indicated to the property's purchaser that he had a 
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personal interest in acquiring the appellant's property 
an old friend and business associate who was also the party 
that the respondent attempted, on several occasions, to 
arrange the sale of the property to. This evidence formed 
the basis of appellant's counterclaim for fraud, conspiracy 
and breach of fiduciary duty. Sale of the property to the 
respondent's friend would have been, under the proposed terms, 
advantageous to the buyer at the expense of the appellant. 
It is possible that the jury could have found that 
the evidence was sufficient to substanttate at least one, if 
not all of appellant's alleged counterclaims. It was not 
plain that there was really no conflict in the evidence upon 
which reasonable minds could differ. This is the standard 
as set forth in the case of Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Construction 
Company, 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973): 
It has long been established in our law 
that a court should not take the case from the 
jury where there is any substantial dispute in 
the evidence on issues of fact, but can properly 
do so only when the matter is so plain that 
there really is no conflict in the evidence 
upon which reasonable minds could differ. As 
was said for this court long ago by the greatly 
respected Justice Frick: 
. unless the question is free from 
doubt, the court cannot pass upon it as a 
matter of law . 
Id. at 361. 
The application of the standard set forth above to the 
facts in the instant case would have allowed the jury to 
a determination of the validity of all of appellant's counter 
claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred 
in amending the original judgment rendered upon the verdict 
on special interrogatories returned by the jury and in not 
allowing the jury to rule upon all of appellant's counter-
claims. Appellant respectfully urges this Court to rein-
state the original judgment and to remand for trial the 
issues of fraud, conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty as 
set forth in appellant's counterclaim. 
DATED this /Sfi day of June, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of June, 1983, 
delivered to the office of David E. West, attorney for the 
plaintiff-respondents, two copies of the foregoing brief. 
Delivery was made to 1300 Walker Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
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